Nicole del Rosario wurde 1989 in Manila, Philippinen geboren. Sie studierte Philosophie an der Ateneo de Manila University auf den Philippinen und unterrichtete währenddessen für drei Jahren im Institut für Philosophie. In ihrer Magisterarbeit (2013) untersuchte sie den kantischen Einfluss der Idee der Sittlichkeit in Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes. Seit Mai 2015 ist sie Promotionsstipendiatin des Katholischen Akademischen Ausländer-Dienstes (KAAD) und promoviert an der Universität Leipzig. Ihre Arbeitsgebiete umfassen die Bereiche Philosophie des Geistes, Moralphilosophie und Erziehungsphilosophie. Ihre Doktorarbeit behandelt die umstrittene Vereinbarkeit von Kants Moralphilosophie und seiner Erziehungsphilosophie.
The Kantian Pedagogic Tension as a Paradox of Autonomy
At the heart of my project is an attempt to address a critical problem whose roots extend to the very beginning of the history of ethics: the question of whether or not virtue can be taught. I engage a particular iteration of the problematic, namely the apparent contradiction between moral education and moral autonomy, which is referred to in the philosophy of education as the “Paradox of Moral Education.” Specifically, the project explores the paradox as it is expressed as a radical incongruity between Kant’s philosophy of moral education and his moral philosophy, which I call the “Kantian Pedagogic Tension.” My work demonstrates that the tension which arises between the two is a manifestation of the more fundamental problem of the Paradox of Autonomy and, understood as such, can be resolved by rethinking what it means for autonomy to function as the cornerstone of moral agency.
My work puts forward a singular response to all four matters—the Paradox of Autonomy, the Kantian Pedagogic Tension, the Paradox of Moral Education, and the question of the teachability of virtue—which are at play with each other: that the unity of law and freedom characteristic of Kantian moral autonomy provides a sufficient framework to dispel these tensions. That is to say, my approach to resolving the paradoxes is to demonstrate that there are no paradoxes at all. I argue that the centrality of freedom as autonomy to the concept of moral agency neither precludes the possibility nor diminishes the importance of moral education in the formation of moral agents. It is my contention that the Kantian Pedagogic Tension only arises as a result of a commitment to a particular understanding of laws of autonomy, namely the widespread conception of it as characterized by its origin, and that an alternative interpretation of it, specifically as characterized by its form, can undermine the contradiction. Interpreting autonomy in the latter manner makes the concept of moral education not only possible but also redeems its necessity. This way, moral education avoids being an absurd process by which one heteronomously shapes autonomy and instead is a continuous, singular practice of freedom.
My project takes one step towards telling the socio-historical story of the development of Kantian moral autonomy, which the apriority of Kant’s moral philosophy is understood as interdicting. The unity of freedom, self-consciousness, and reason in Kant’s thought, however, requires that we rethink not only the function of moral education and the nature of freedom but also the constitution of self-consciousness and reason. In awarding moral education an integral role in the realization of a moral agent’s autonomy, one necessarily also tells a socio-historically situated developmental story of self-consciousness and reason as these three burgeon in a singular movement.