If Kant’s fundamental question about morality is ‘how is morality possible?’ then the answer is to be found in his faculty moral psychology. His other doctrines, that freedom (and so morality) are inexplicable or noumenal and that freedom and morality can only be given a ‘practical proof’ should not prevent scholars from turning to his faculty psychology for answers to the questions of how he thinks morality is possible and how he argues that morality is not chimerical, but actual. In this paper, I first defend the approach of looking at Kant’s faculty moral psychology. Then I present that psychology and show how it sheds light on his controversial practical proof, i.e. the fact of reason demonstration in the Critique of Practical Reason.

*Zur Person:* Patricia Kitcher is Roberta and William Campbell Professor of Humanities and Professor of Philosophy and Columbia University; she is currently a fellow at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin. She has worked on topics in the Philosophy of Psychology and in Kant’s theoretical philosophy. She is currently working on Kant’s theory of the self and on his practical philosophy.