The judgment that $p$, the judgment that $\neg p$, and the judgment that $p, \text{if } q$, all involve thought of one and the same state of affairs. What does it mean for one and the same thought $p$ to be part of those judgments? While the force/content distinction as drawn by Frege (as well as its Neo-Fregean variations) might appear to provide for an answer to this question, it has often been observed that it leaves the relation between force and content unintelligible. In this paper, I argue that the right answer to this observation does not consist in avoiding or abandoning the force/content distinction (for it will necessarily reemerge in one guise or other), but to draw it in a non-dualistic way. I attempt to show that this can be achieved by starting with a minimal Fregean notion of a thought (i.e. as that with regard to which it makes sense to ask whether it is true or false) and exhibiting this notion as a pluraliantum, i.e. showing that it is not by chance that there is more than one thought. If, in face of that, we go on to ask how thoughts as such are related, we can show that any occurrence of a determinate thought must come along with one out of a variety of systematically interrelated ways of logically binding oneself. Accordingly, we can and need to distinguish between ways of binding oneself in thinking and the determinacy of what one is thereby bound to. It will emerge from this way of redrawing the force/content distinction that thought, in virtue of its form, presupposes expression. In light of the considerations just sketched, I go on to deal with some current attempts to clarify what it is for a proposition (i.e. that expresses a thought) to occur in another. I will not attempt to exhibit specific answers to this question as mistaken but to exhibit their shared way of asking the question as confused: There is no single answer to this question, because if there were, the occurrence of a determinate thought would not as such be tied to a determinate way of binding oneself in thinking. – We can, however, rephrase the question as follows such as to avoid the confusion: What it is for a certain act of logically binding oneself in a specific way to involve dependent acts of thinking which do neither come along with a force of their own nor lack in force altogether but participate in the force of the overall act of thinking which they are part of?