Delusions are commonly described as irrational or otherwise deficient beliefs. And yet, delusions fail to display most of the typical properties of belief-states: they fail to properly respond to evidence, they fail to motivate action, they fail to provoke appropriate affective responses, and they also fail to interact with actual belief states in the way we would expect them to, if they were in fact beliefs. In this talk, I will first discuss various problems that such doxastic accounts of delusion in both the philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience face. I will then argue that given the nature of delusions, we should rather describe them as states of the imagination. I will briefly discuss the consequences that my suggestion would have for our taxonomy of mental states, and I will argue that it is both more consistent with the empirical literature on the topic and with widely shared philosophical assumptions about the nature of belief.

Zur Person:

11:00 Uhr, Neuer Senatssaal, Ritterstraße 26
InteressentInnen sind herzlich eingeladen!