Logicians today typically think of logic as the study of arguments, where an argument is thought of as a complex containing premises and a conclusion. For logicians working in the Aristotelian tradition, however, logic was the study of the syllogism, where a syllogism was typically taken to be premises able to give rise to a conclusion, rather than a complex already containing a conclusion. I argue that this is essential to understanding certain deep differences in outlook between traditional and modern logic. The “bare premises” view of the syllogism reflects a view of logic close in its subject matter to metaphysics. Just as the metaphysician asks what makes these bricks, say, something more than just a pile of bricks (a house), so too the logician asks what makes a series of propositions a genuinely unified piece of discourse rather than a mere aggregate of sayings. While this unity may be explicated by drawing inferences and stating conclusions, the topic of logic on this view is the unity that makes inferences available rather than inference itself.