It is a tempting thought in the philosophy of agency and action that we can understand the standards that govern action by understanding agency as having some general constitutive aim. Moreover, philosophers have recently argued that such an aim can explain the practical reasons that agents have, as such. I argue that these arguments lack a plausible transfer principle needed to provide the promised breadth of reasons. Because of this, constitutive aims have much less explanatory power than advertised. I conclude by considering alternative explanatory strategies in the same spirit.

Zur Person:
Kathryn Lindeman is assistant professor of philosophy at Saint Louis University and in the fall will be assistant professor of law in the Department of Philosophy at the University of South Carolina. She works in metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of law. Her research focuses on questions related to whether and how we can understand the nature, authority, and content of evaluative standards by appeal to the nature of the kinds and individuals those standards are authoritative for.

11:00 Uhr, Neuer Senatssaal, Ritterstraße 26
InteressentInnen sind herzlich eingeladen!