Comparative philosophy, like history of philosophy, is often seen as having a lower status within the discipline of philosophy than such ‘central’ areas as logic, epistemology, and metaphysics. Yet there is increasing recognition of the need to broaden the canon and diversify the curriculum in philosophy, and what goes on under the heading of ‘comparative philosophy’ can certainly contribute to achieving this. So what exactly is comparative philosophy, and what kind of rationale can be provided for it? Should it be renamed or reconceptualized to do better justice to what it does or could do? How might one respond to some of the objections that are raised to it? In this talk I want to address these and related questions by drawing on both Zhuangzi’s conception of perspectives ‘opening out’ into one another in the qìwùlùn chapter of the Zhuangzi and Wittgenstein’s remarks on aspect perception. Seeing some of Zhuangzi’s ideas from a Wittgensteinian perspective, and some of Wittgenstein’s ideas from a Zhuangzian perspective, will itself provide an illustration of the fruitfulness of comparative philosophy.