Putnam on Conceptual Truth

Throughout his philosophical career, Putnam was preoccupied with the question of “what survives of the traditional notion of a priori truth” (“Intellectual Autobiography”, 2015) in light of the recurring historical phenomenon, made prominent by the scientific revolutions of the early decades of the twentieth century, in the course of which “something that was literally inconceivable has turned out to be true” (“It Ain’t Necessarily So”, 1962). Putnam’s redefinition of the notion of “conceptual truth” in terms of the notion of “quasi-necessity relative to a conceptual scheme” (which directly impugns the analytic-synthetic dichotomy) is meant to accommodate the possibility actualized by this historical phenomenon.

The present paper traces the development of Putnam’s notion of “statement quasi-necessary relative to a conceptual scheme” from 1962 on and defends it against some natural objections having to do with the bearing of modal relativity on the behavior of negation.

The main contention of the paper is that the main tenets of Putnam’s semantic externalism inform his twin notions of “conceptual truth” and “quasi-necessity relative to a conceptual scheme”, as they provide his early critique of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy with a positive basis, and that these tenets can and must be extended to negation itself.

Zur Person:
Jean-Philippe Narboux is currently Associate Professor in Philosophy at the University Bordeaux Montaigne. He was a junior fellow at the Institut Universitaire de France (2009-2014) and a fellow at the Berlin Institute for Advanced Study (Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin) (2017-2018). He is the co-editor of The Legacy of Thompson Clarke (Brill, 2014), Finding One’s Way Through Wittgenstein’s Logical Investigations: New Essays on §§1-88 (Springer, 2017), New Perspectives on Frege’s Logical Investigations (Mundaréu, forthcoming). His recent articles include « Is Self-Consciousness Consciousness of One’s Self? », in Wittgenstein and Phenomenology (Routledge, 2018); « Pensées en première personne et cogitationes cartésiennes », in Les formes historiques du cogito (Garnier, 2019). He has recently completed a book on the topic of negation (Essai sur le problème de la négation, forthcoming at Vrin).