Negation, Falsehood, and Nonsense

We begin with three basic puzzles concerning negation. First, it may seem puzzling that one should be able to negate \( p \) at all, given that \( p \) may not be the case. For when \( p \) (e.g. “The library is on fire”) is not the case, nothing corresponds to it, and it may seem that \( p \) cannot make sense and so cannot be negated when nothing corresponds to it. However, should we resolve this first puzzle, it will seem all the more puzzling that negative categorial statements (e.g. “Blue is not a smell”, “The soul is not extended”) should make any sense, given that there is no intelligible possibility that they can be said to negate. Finally, it should seem puzzling that the empirical statement “The library is not on fire” and the categorial statement “Blue is not a smell” should be assumed to employ “not” in the same sense, given that the former seems to require the intelligibility of what is negated while the latter seems to preclude it. We then proceed to examine the differences and relations between the empirical and the categorial uses of negation with a view to addressing the second and third puzzles. Finally, we articulate some further difficulties about negation arising in connection with the phenomenon of “conceptual revolution”. We end by asking what becomes of the traditional notions of “category” and “conceptual truth” in light of our attempts to address these difficulties. Authors studied include Plato, Spinoza, Kant, Wittgenstein, Putnam.

For further information visit: fagi.uni-leipzig.de