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Kant’s Ordinary Moral Agent

The aim will be to explore a fuller account of Kant’s theory of agency than those currently available. Among others, we will try to answer the following questions:

What are the similarities and differences between Kant’s claims about cognitive subjects and moral agents?

How should we understand Kant’s claim that humans take two standpoints on themselves, when, as self-conscious creatures, they know very well that they are not in the grip of mechanistic laws?

Does Kant develop a theory of moral agency from a theory of agency—or does his account run in the opposite direction?

How does Kant think that humans understand others as moral agents?

Kant admired Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. Do Smith’s views, as well as Rousseau’s shed light on Kant’s views of interpersonal relations in, e.g. the Anthropology?

How do humans give laws to themselves?

If the human will is subject to the moral law, how does Kant think that bad actions are possible?

What is the relation between Kant’s theory of moral agency and his Anthropology project of showing what free humans can make of themselves? How can the study of anthropology, or culture more generally, help?