This paper connects the fields of philosophy of action and of explainable artificial intelligence (AI). We investigate whether it can ever be appropriate to explain the outputs of AI systems by appeal to practical reasons and reasoning of these systems. We argue that this can indeed be fitting. To this end, we first present an argument that starts from the premise that we use AI systems because they work so well for us and then defend our claim against four objections.

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